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PRE-TRIAL IN COLORADO IN
WORDS AND AT WORK
T. RABER TAYLOR
of the Denver Bar and Colorado Member of Pre-Trial Committee
United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
Rule 16, the pre-trial conference rule of the Colorado Rules of
Civil Procedure, provides:
In any action, the court may in its discretion direct the attor-
ney for the parties to appear before it for a conference to consider:
(1) The simplification of the issues;
(2) The necessity or desirability of amendments to the plead-
ings;
(3) The possibility of obtaining admissions of fact and of docu-
ments which will avoid unnecessary proof;
(4) The limitation of the number of expert witnesses;
(5) The advisability of a preliminary reference of issues to a
master for findings to be used as evidence when the trial
is to be by jury;
(6) Such other matters as may aid in the disposition of the
action.
The court shall make an order which recites the action taken
at the conference, the amendments allowed to the pleadings, and
the agreements made by the parties as to any of the matters con-
sidered, and which limits the issues for trial to those not disposed of
by admissions or agreements of counsel; and such order when en-
tered controls the subsequent course of the action, unless modified
at the trial to prevent manifest injustice. The court in its discre-
tion may establish by rule a pre-trial calendar on which actions may
be placed for consideration as above provided and may either con-
fine the calendar to jury actions or to non-jury actions or extend it
to all actions.
This rule, as well as the other Colorado Rules of Civil Proced-
ure, was adopted January 6, 1941, to be effective April 6, 1941.
The Colorado pre-trial rule is the same as Rule 16 of the Rules of
Civil Procedure for the Districts Courts of the United States
adopted in 1938.
From 1938 to 1941, Philip S. Van Cise and his committees
sacrificed themselves with the hope that rules of civil procedure
might be adopted for courts of record in Colorado, following inso-
far as practicable the Federal Rules of 1938. It was their-hope that
a Colorado lawyer would be as much at home in the courts of the
United States as in those of the state of Colorado.
Percy S. Morris's scholarly address on "Pre-Trial Procedure:
Formulating Issues-Rule 16,"1 gives a complete statement of the
' COLO. STAT. ANN., vol. 1, Appendix D, page 463 (1935).
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history of, and the reasons for adopting this rule. He summarizes
the history as follows:
The history of pre-trial procedure is interesting. Before the
adoption of the federal rule, it had proved exceedingly helpful in
state courts in Detroit and Boston in promoting the settlement of
cases without trial, the shortening of the time of the court, the jury,
the litigants and the witnesses in the actual trial, the saving of
time to the attorneys, both in the preparation for trial and in the
trial itself, and relieving congestion in the trial calendars.
Two prophetic statements from this address should be used to
evaluate the success of pre-trial procedure in Colorado courts.
These statements are:
This rule prescribes an innovation in our practice which, if put
into effect by the judges and wisely administered by them, will prove
to be one of the most beneficial changes in procedure made by the
rules.
The attorney for either side may suggest to the court the advis-
ability of calling a conference, but, even if such suggestion is made,
it is still in the discretion of the judge as to whether he should call
it. Practical experience has shown that, if the practice is to be ef-
fective, it should not be left to the attorneys to suggest or request
the conference, but that it should be called by the judge on his own
initiative.
PRE-TRIAL IN THE FEDERAL COURT
With the 1938 adoption of the pre-trial rule, Judge J. Foster
Symes of the United States District Court for the District of Colo-
rado vigorously applied pre-trial procedure to every claim. In
words, the trial court's Rule 6 was adopted. It reads:
All cases at issue shall be set for pre-trial and for trial on the
merits at times to be designated by the court. Reasonable notice of
the time and place of the setting for pre-trial and for trial on the
merits shall be given by the clerk of the court by mail to counsel
of record or to the parties.
Judge Symes and his clerk initiated the placing of all cases
on the pre-trial docket. Every case had to be pre-tried, and after
every pre-trial, the court entered a pre-trial order. It was Judge
Symes's opinion that a pre-trial was as important as a trial. All
exhibits were marked and either admitted or excluded. Obscure or
disputed points of law were ordered briefed so as to be ruled upon
after the pre-trial conference and before trial. A full statement of
each side's position was heard by the court. Where proper dis-
covery foundation had been laid, a full disclosure of all facts was
ordered at the pre-trial conference. The words of the pre-trial
rule, in short, were made to work in the Federal court. As a result,
a judgment was entered on some claims at the pre-trial. On a larger
number of claims, the full disclosure prompted settlement soon
after the pre-trial. On claims that went to trial, the attorneys
were better prepared. The trial ran smoothly. It was more under-
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standable to both the court and the jury and took much less time.
The even tempo of the trial was not delayed for identification of
exhibits and rulings on their admissibility, nor for recesses for
arguments on points of law.
The success of pre-trial in the Federal courts is due not only
to the wording of the rule and its application in court, but especially
to the institutes and demonstrations sponsored by the Federal
judges and the bar. After ten years of pre-trial in the Federal
District Court for Colorado and a continuing educational program,
pre-trial, it can be said, is successfully at work in the Federal court.
At least 75 per cent of all attorneys appearing in the Federal trial
court are fully ready for the pre-trial conference. The remaining
25 per cent include some who seldom appear in the Federal court
and the newly admitted attorneys. However, even those in this
group are usually prepared for the pre-trial conference on their
second case.
2
PRE-TRIAL IN THE COLORADO DISTRICT COURTS
Rule 83 of the Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure specifically
authorizes trial courts to adopt rules. Only four of the fifteen state
judicial district courts have taken advantage of this power and
implemented the pre-trial Rule 16 with a rule of court. The four
judicial districts with court rules on pre-trial are the Second (Den-
ver), the Fourth (Colorado Springs), the Eighth (Boulder, Fort
Collins, and Greeley), and the Tenth (Pueblo). The pre-trial court
rules are of two types, permissive and mandatory. The rule in the
second judicial district is mandatory. "The judge . . . shall hold
a pre-trial conference .... Each judge shall keep a pre-trial cal-
endar upon which each case in his division shall be set for pre-
trial conference". 3 No case is to be set on the trial docket until a
pre-trial conference has been conducted. A similar mandatory rule
of court is found in the fourth judicial district.
4
A permissive rule of court is found in the eighth judicial dis-
trict. "Pre-trial conferences may be had after a case is at issue as
the court directs, either upon motion or suggestion by either party
upon notice, or upon the court's own motion." 5 There is no pre-trial
calendar. The same is true in the tenth judicial district.
6
Statistics on pre-trial at work in the state district courts are
not available. Some day we hope Colorado will have an administra-
tive office for the state courts. This office would keep the statistics
and books necessary to determine whether the state constitutional
The "Annual Report of the Director of the Administrative Office of the United
States Courts" gives accurate and interesting figures on how pre-trial has helped to in-
sure prompt justice in the Federal courts. See also, "A Panel Discussion of the Prac-
tical Operation of the Colorado and Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Concerning De-
positions and Discovery and Pre-Trial Procedure", 21 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 38 (1948).
1 Rule XI, Rules of Court, 2nd Jud. Dist.
4 Rule IV, Rules of Court, 4th Jud. Dist.
5Rule VIII, Rules of Court, 8th Jud. Dist.
'Article I, Rule 19, Rules of Court, 10th Jud. Dist.
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requirement I of a speedy remedy for every injury and administra-
tion of justice without delay, is being given to the people.
In the absence of statistics, experienced opinion must be relied
on. However, before considering estimates, the importance of the
pre-trial conference must not be misunderstood. The pre-trial con-
ference is an important procedure, but it should never, in practice,
be isolated from the fullest use of deposition and discovery (Rules
26 to 37, both inclusive) and summary judgment (Rule 56). Pre-
trial is not a substitute for timely use of discovery procedures. The
pre-trial conference should be the climax which brings these pro-
cedures into focus. The January 23, 1950, decision in Duffy v.
Gross 8 illustrates this point. In December, 1945, there was a two-
car intersection accident in Pueblo. A damage claim was the result.
The defendants did not file a motion for a bill of particulars, nor did
they use any other means to get a particular statement of the al-
leged negligence. The case was at issue on September 13, 1947
and was set for trial to the jury on Monday, October 20, 1947. On
October 20, 1947, the defendants obtained a continuance to October
27, 1947. Finally on October 27, 1947, the defendants asked for a
pre-trial conference. This request was granted and set for 2 o'clock
p. m. that same day. At the conference the defendants finally asked
plaintiff for a statement of the acts of negligence on which the plain-
tiff was proposing to rely. Plaintiff's objection was sustained, and it
was not until the plaintiff's opening statement at the beginning
of a four day trial that the defendants learned of plaintiff's posi-
tion. The defendants lost and assigned as error on appeal the trial
court's refusal to order the disclosure at the pre-trial conference.
The Supreme Court affirmed. In its first opinion on pre-trial, it
said:
... From all of these circumstances, we do not see wherein the
defendants were prejudiced by the ruling of the trial court in the
pre-trial conference. Further discussion of the failure of the court
to compel plaintiffs to disclose the specific acts of negligence upon
which they relied, and which is the real basis of this assignment of
error, it not necessary other than to say that the pre-trial confer-
ence rule is designed to expedite trials when certain facts may be
admitted and the necessity of proof thereof obviated. The proper
courtesy of the profession enables this to be done, usually in a few
moments at the beginning of a trial, without pre-trial conference.
Usually, obvious facts are admitted, but we see nothing in the rule
that is compulsory as to the disclosure of the details of the issues
to be made by the pleadings. As to whether or not a pre-trial con-
ference is to be called, rests entirely in the discretion of the trial
court and that discretion abides throughout the procedure.'
The purposes and flexible uses of the pre-trial are broader
than the normal courtesy of the profession which enables certain
'COLO. CONST. Art. II, § 6.
8Duffy v. Gross. Colo. ...... 214 P. 2d 498 (1950), 1949-50 Advance Sheet 198




facts to be admitted and strict proof to be obviated. This case
illustrates a failure of the defendants to use any of the discovery
facilities provided for under the rules, and then in a belated con-
ference trying to use pre-trial in place of discovery. The pre-trial
conference, to be effective, must be before the trial and, in most
cases, not on the day of the trial.
RULE GAINING IN FAVOR AMONG JUDGES AND LAWYERS
A sampling of the opinions of various Colorado district court
judges has yielded a variety of attitudes toward the pre-trial con-
ference. Some judges do not conduct pre-trial conferences. The
reasons for this disregard of Rule 16 are varied. Some judges, on
the motion of attorneys, permit them to be held, but with a belief
that they have no value. Some judges insist on the use of a pre-trial
conference, but their explanation of their use often reveals a mis-
application of the nature of the pre-trial contemplated by the rule.
This latter group includes the judges who telescope the pre-trial
conference into the actual trial itself as well as those who label
as a pre-trial conference, the meetings of the attorneys in person,
or even by telephone or by letter, and the stipulation of facts on
issues that result from such meetings. An increasing majority of
judges, however, require pre-trial in all cases and are studying
and exploring its flexibility in order to obtain its maximum advan-
tages.
Among lawyers, pre-trial is receiving greater, though not
unanimous, acceptance. Probably the most controversial factor
in the consideration of pre-trial is its relation to the extra-judicial
settlement of pending litigation. By its very name and nature, the
pre-trial is not, and should not be regarded, as an instrument for
the judicial coercion of the settlement of claims. It is true that
many settlements follow as a result of pre-trial conference. How-
ever, these settlements are merely by-products of the pre-trial pro-
cedure the same as settlements which result from a sharply con-
tested trial. The purpose of the pre-trial conference is to prepare
for trial. In fact, when trial is improbable, there is ordinarily no
occasion or purpose for a pre-trial conference. Some lawyers are
adverse to the pre-trial procedure because, they allege, it forces
them to show their hand. Such an attitude in the Colorado trial
courts of today is quite unrealistic. It mistakes the real function
of the pre-trial rule, and what is worse, it ignores the fact that the
rules for discovery are set up to give the opportunity to explore the
opponent's case.
No statistics or newspaper comment on pre-trial in areas out-
side of Denver have been found. The Rocky Mountain News, in
January and February of this year, focused attention upon the
jammed docket in the civil division of the Denver district court.
The reporters conceded that the pre-trial system had been helpful,
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but urged that at least two additional judges were necessary. 10
How helpful pre-trial has been in the Denver district court is
best brought out by some figures obtained through the courtesy of
the clerk of that court, J. B. Goodman, Jr. Most judges have con-
ceded the use of discovery procedure and pre-trial for contract
claims. They have been reluctant, however, to accept pre-trial for
damages cases which bulk large on every docket. Therefore, a
sample was made of some automobile damage cases filed and tried
in 1940, 1942, and 1948.11
Those cases filed in 1940 took an average of 2.79 days for trial.
Only 21 per cent of them were tried to the court. After the new
rules and pre-trial became effective, an improvement was noted.
The trial time for cases filed in 1942 was only 1.5 days. This was a
saving of 1.29 days per case tried. 45 per cent of all of the cases
tried were tried to the court, compared to 21 per cent of the cases
under the code. The trial time for cases filed in 1948 was also only
1.5 days. Of the total number of damage cases filed in 1948 that
were tried, 40 per cent of them were tried to the court.
Not all of the claims filed in 1942 and 1948 and later tried were
pre-tried. As late as 1948, only 27 out of 60 cases had a pre-trial
conference. Pre-trial was waived in 19 cases, and in 14 cases there
was neither pre-trial nor waiver. However 11 of these 14 cases
were one-day trials to the court. An outstanding value of pre-trial
has been the reduction in the number of cases which have been
actually tried either to the court or to the jury. Long experienced
district court officials in Denver expressed the opinion that the
exchange of information contemplated by the discovery procedures
and pre-trial conferences had substantially reduced the need for
trials. Statistics to verify or refute this opinion are not available.
FREQUENT FAILURE TO ENTER PRE-TRIAL ORDER
Rule 16 provides, "The court shall make an order which recites
the action taken at the conference . . . ." In many of the cases
studied no pre-trial order was made by the court. The absence of
the pre-trial order is a great loss to the court and to counsel. Pre-
trial orders are not entered and mailed to counsel for the same
reason that there is not an adequate number of judges. Money has
not been made available to provide the additional stenographic
help. However, in many of the files are found the handwritten
notes of the judges on the pre-trial conference. In some cases these
have been adequate.
The absence of undue delays in the administration of justice,
wherein there is provided speedy remedy for every injury, has
always been a yearning of civilized man. This yearning is firmly
intrenched in the Colorado constitution. The people of the State
"0Rocky Mountain News, Feb. 8, 1950, p. 22.
"No case filed, but not tried, was included in any sample.
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of Colorado look to the judges to be wise and prompt administra-
tors. Percy Morris voiced the prophesy back in 1941 that if the
pre-trial conference were put into effect by the judges and wisely
administered by them, it would prove to be one of the most bene-
ficial changes under our law.12 Prompt justice is a constant chal-
lenge to, and a primary responsibility of, our judges. The pre-trial
is now a well-proved, modern instrument. It is a flexible instrument
that is adaptable to the constant variation of the human element in
litigation. While the pre-trial conference rule has been adopted in
the Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure, our trial courts, for the most
part, have not implemented the pre-trial conference rule with trial
court rules making pre-trial mandatory and establishing pre-trial
calendars. Even where trial courts have adopted an implementing
pre-trial rule, the judges' warm and enthusiastic use of the pre-trial
conference has been lacking. This lack is, in part, due to the judges'
not having had an opportunity to see the benefits to the people and
the judiciary when the pre-trial is warmly and wisely used.
For the future, it can be hoped that more of our trial courts
will adopt a mandatory implementing pre-trial rule and a pre-trial
calendar. Let us hope that in 1960 it can be reported that, during
the past decade, attorneys fully and ingeniously used discovery pro-
cedures, and that the judges insured a speedy remedy for every in-
jury by use of the pre-trial conference.
A COMMENT ON PRE-TRIAL PROCEDURE
HON. J. FOSTER SYMES
judge, U. S. District Court for the District of Colo. (Ret.)
Pre-trial has now been a part of the reform procedure in the
Federal courts long enough to demonstrate that it is a great success
when properly used. True, this section of the new rules is indefinite
as to methods. Practice simply leaves that up to the judge. Success
or failure, therefore, is strictly up to the court and the members of
the bar who use it. I have been an advocate of it from the first time
it was suggested before the Rules were adopted. It will not succeed
unless the court is sympathetic with the new procedure, insists
upon its use and insists further, that the bar take it seriously.
In a good many courts, especially in the state courts, it is a
voluntary matter whether the case is "pre-trialed" or not. Where
used by a sympathetic court and bar, there is no question of its
advantages in saving time and effectuating justice. Every case in
the Federal District Court in Colorado is "pre-trialed" as a matter
of course, and the bar is now educated to take it seriously and pre-
pare for it the same as they do for the trial of the case itself.
Recently, Judge Phillips, in speaking to the bar on the success
12 Supra, note 1.
DICTA
DICTA
of the District Court of Colorado in keeping up to date and turning
out more business than most any other district court in the United
States, gave chief credit for this to the use of pre-trial procedure.
Its obvious advantage is the saving of time for litigants, counsel,
and the court by a frank discussion of the law and facts in chambers
after a case is at issue and before trial. Each side is compelled to
disclose witnesses, what they will testify to, the legal theory upon
which they will proceed, and the legal points that will be raised in
the trial of the case which can be settled before trial. These matters
are discussed, and if the court wishes, it can decide questions of
law before the case goes to trial, if a trial is necessary. In this
way all elements of surprise are taken out of the case, and the
issues are simplified so that they are thoroughly understood by the
court and jury. It prevents a law suit from being a contest between
counsel rather than between parties. Many lawyers object to this
as they are fond of keeping their facts a secret, springing a ques-
tion of law, etc., at the trial and taking the other side by surprise.
Furthermore, when lawyers and litigants learn of the other
side's case by the use of pre-trial procedure, they are not quite so
sure of the strength of their own position and are willing to talk
compromise and settlement. My experience has been that many
clients do not make a full disclosure of the case to their counsel
and only tell him the facts favorable to their contentions. They,
as well as their counsel, are often surprised to learn at pre-trial
of the strength of their opponent's case. This makes them more
reasonable and willing to talk compromise when they learn there
is a question as to the correctness of their position.
Some very humorous experiences have occurred in this respect.
One example will be sufficient to illustrate this point. An auto-
mobile accident occurred in New Mexico, and the case was tried
before me in Colorado. The principal question was the determina-
tion of who was employing the driver of the offending car. A pre-
trial conference disclosed that the driver was ostensibly working
for one firm, but was also taking orders from another firm who
directed his movements. This the client had not disclosed to his
counsel, and when the information came out in chambers, the at-
torney was flabbergasted. It did not take him long to go out and
settle the case as should have been done before. When people learn
the weaknesses of their case by the disclosures at pre-trial, and
discover what the other side has in the way of evidence, they are
not so cocksure of victory and are willing to "talk settlement".
Nearly 50 per cent of the cases in the United States District
Court for Colorado are settled before trial and after pre-trial con-
ference. This, of course, saves the time of the court and clerk and
permits the disposition of business much faster than otherwise. I
am a great believer in pre-trial procedure. It should be insisted
upon by every trial judge.
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NOTES ON PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO
COLORADO RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
WILLIAM B. MILLER
Secretary of the Colorado and Denver Bar Associatiois
Out of the 466 members of the Denver Bar Association who
voted for retention of the Rules of Civil Procedure in the postcard
ballot conducted during the latter part of December, 384 also in-
dicated that "so far as applicable to Colorado, the Colorado Rules
should include the amendments adopted to the Federal Rules." 1 No
statistics are available to indicate what the thinking of other local
bar associations is on this question; but, since they were all over-
whelmingly in favor of retention of the Rules, it is assumed that the
majority of Colorado lawyers throughout the state likewise favor
amendment of the state Rules in line with the Federal changes.
The Rules Committee 2 appointed by the Supreme Court of
Colorado has recommended to the court, for such action as it may
see fit to take, certain amendments to the Colorado Rules which em-
body many of these Federal amendments. These recommendations
are set out in two reports, one dated September 1, 1948, and the
other dated January 4, 1950. About 150 copies of the first report
were printed, and these given only limited distribution. Since the
second report is only a typewritten addendum with an even more
restricted distribution, it is doubtful if many attorneys are aware
of the specific purpose and effect of these recommended amend-
ments, even though they favor conformity in Colorado and Federal
civil procedure. To remedy this lack of information concerning
the proposed changes, it was thought that a summary of the more
importance changes and the committee notes thereon might prove
interesting and useful to Colorado lawyers.
BACKGROUND OV THE RULES AND THEIR REVISION
Preliminary to a consideration of the proposed amendments, it
is appropriate to consider their background. The Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure were promulgated by the Supreme Court of the
I The results of the Denver bar poll were first reported to the Supreme Court on
January'26, 1950 in a letter to Judge Mortimer Stone, chairman of the rules committee
within the court. On that date 515 of the 770 ballots mailed had been returned with the
following result : For retention of the Rules-462 ; for return to the Code--35 ; no opin-
ion-18. Four additional ballots subsequently were received to raise the total favoring
the Rules to 466. In addition to the 384 out of the first group who favored the Federal
amendments, 69 expressed no opinion and 13 opposed further conformity to the Federal
Rules. Of the 35 voting for a return to the Code, 13 indicated that if the Rules are re-
tained the Federal amendments should be adopted, and three out of the 18 expressing
no opinion on the primary question, nonetheless, voted for the amendments.
2 As presently constituted: Jean S. Breitenstein, chairman; Joseph G. Hodges;
Viggo H. Johnson; Thomas Keely; and Percy S. Morris.
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United States pursuant to the authority conferred by the Act of
June 19, 1934,3 and became effective on September 16, 1938. The
Colorado Bar Association, at its meeting in September, 1938, unan-
imously adopted a resolution to the effect that the Colorado Code
of Civil Procedure be amended to conform to the new Federal
Rules. In order to dispel any doubt which might exist as to the
power of the court to prescribe general rules to govern the prac-
tice and procedure in civil actions, the General Assembly passed
an appropriate statute in 1939.
4
A Colorado Bar Association committee, under the able leader-
ship of Philip S. Van Cise, submitted to the court a draft of pro-
posed rules. On January 6, 1941, the Colorado Rules of Civil
Procedure were adopted by the court which at that time made a
statement recognizing, among other things, that:
• . . in proceeding under these Rules, need for amendments or
new rules may develop. The right to exercise necessary power to that
end is reserved by the Court, but in its consideration it will have
regard for well advised adherence to fixed standards.5
Since the adoption of the Colorado Rules, the court has found
it necessary to amend the following rules: 4 (f), 4 (g), 4 (h), 79 (c),
98 (c), 111 (c), 115 (h), 115 (i), 117, 201, and 204.
In June, 1946, the Advisory Committee to the Supreme Court
of the United States recommended 66 amendments to the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure and three amendments to the Appendix of
Forms. These amendments were adopted by that court on January
3, 1947, and became effective March 19, 1948.
The Colorado Supreme Court on February 2, 1948, requested
its Rules Committee to study the revisions in the Federal Rules
and to recommend to the court "such changes in our rules as you
may deem advisable in the light of the federal revision." This com-
mittee made its report on September 1, 1948, and stated therein:
A study of the revisions of the Federal Rules discloses that all
are not applicable or desirable in state procedure. Your Committee
recommends that 37 amendments be made to the Colorado Rules in
order to conform to the amendments to the Federal Rules and that
2 amendments to the Appendix of forms be made for the same pur-
pose. In addition the Committee recommends 9 other amendments
to the Colorado Rules.
Subsequently, the attention of the committee was directed to
the need for revisions of Rule 4 covering Process, and Rule 120
covering Orders Authorizing Sales under Powers. On January 4,
1950, the committee submitted to the court a second report recom-
mending certain changes in these two rules.
48 Stat. 1064.
Colo. Laws 1939, c. 80, p. 264.
5107 Colo. Ix (1941).
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A number of amendments to the Federal Rules were not rec-
ommended by the committee for adoption in Colorado. The reasons
therefore may be grouped into three categories: (1) The defect in
the Federal rule had been foreseen and corrected in the Colorado
rule, (2) The Federal rule relates to a purely Federal subject, and
(3) The Federal rule, or amendment, while of general application,
was deemed unsuited to local conditions. The committee filed with
the court a statement as to its reasons for rejection of each Federal
amendment which was not recommended for adoption in Colorado.
MAJOR CHANGES RECOMMENDED FOR COLORADO
Within the space allotted, it is impossible to present in detail
all the proposed changes. Accordingly, those which are merely
clarifying or conforming will be omitted. The amendments will be
discussed in the numerical order of the rules affected. It should be
understood that in each case the change is that recommended by
the committee. The court may or may not agree with its committee.
Rule 4-Process
The suggested changes in Rule 4, involve two procedural
matters: (1) service of process in a foreign country, and (2) the
contents of the verified motion for an order for publication of
summons. As to the first, the requirements of the existing rule
are ineffective because United States consuls are now forbidden
by the Department of State either to serve process issued by
state courts or to designate any one to make such service. The
amendment authorizes several classes of officials at the place of
service to make the service. It follows closely the provisions in
the Civil Code of New York. As to the second, the Real Estate
Title Standards Committee of the Denver Bar Association has
unanimously voted to request the Rules Committee to recommend
to the court an amendment to Rule 4 (h) covering publication which
will make more readily understood the requirements as to stating
the address or last known address of the person to be served.
Rule 6-Time
The amendment to Rule 6 (b), relating to enlargement of time,
further restricts the power of the court to extend the time for cer-
tain actions. It is based on the view that there should be a definite
point where it can be said that a judgment is final. Under the rule
as amended the court may not extend the time for substitution of
parties under Rule 25, for a motion for judgment notwithstanding
a verdict under Rule 50 (b), for motion to amend findings under
Rule 52 (b), to amend a judgment under Rules 52 (b) or new 59
(e), or to relieve a party from a judgment under Rule 60 (b), ex-
cept as stated in those particular rules.
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Rule 6 (c) is changed to provide that the period of time al-
lowed for taking any proceeding is not affected by the continued
existence of a term of court. The purpose of the amendment is to
prevent reliance upon the continued existence of a term as a source
of power to disturb the finality of a judgment upon grounds other
than those stated in the Rules.
Rule 12-Defenses and Objections
Some of the more important proposed changes concern Rule
12. The Federal amendment to 12 (b) added, as a defense which
may be raised by motion, the failure to join an indispensable party.
With this the committee concurred. In studying the rule, the com-
mittee came to the realization that in the adoption Of the original
Rule 12 (b) a mistake had been made in following too closely the
Federal rule. One of the grounds of defense permitted by the Fed-
eral rule is that of improper venue. So far as the Colorado courts
are concerned, improper venue is not a defense. It is merely the
basis for change of venue. Hence, the committee recommended that
improper venue be deleted as a defense.
Other changes in 12 (b) and 12 (g) make it clear that a party
who resorts to a motion to raise any of the defenses and objections
specified in Rule 12 must file with such motion all motions that are
then available to him. Under the original rule defenses and ob-
jections were divided into two groups which could be the subjects
of successive motions. The filing of all such motions at the same
time does not constitute a waiver of any defense raised by any
such motion.
Rules 12 (b) and 12 (c) are changed to provide that if, on a
motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim or for judgment on
the pleadings, matters outside the pleadings are presented to and
not excluded by the court, the motion shall be treated as one for
summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 56. Under
the original Federal Rules, there was a division in the Federal
courts on the right to support or resist such motions by extraneous
matter such as affidavits and depositions. Some Colorado trial
courts permitted the use of such material. The committee was of
the opinion that the trial court should have authority to permit the
introduction of extraneous matter such as may be offered on a
motion for summary judgment. If the court does not exclude such
matter, the motion should be treated as a motion for summary
judgment. Where extraneous matter is received, the tying of fur-
ther proceedings to the summary judgment rule gives the courts
a definite basis in the Rules for disposition of the motion.
Rule-13-Counter Claim and Cross Claim
Rule 13 (a) refers to compulsory counterclaims. The pro-
posed change insures against an undesirable possibility under the
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original rule whereby a party having a claim which would be the
subject of a compulsory counterclaim, could avoid stating it as such
by bringing an independent action in another court after the com-
mencement of the action, but before filing his pleading thereto.
The amendment to Rule 13 (g) permits as a cross-claim any
claim "relating to any property that is the subject matter of the
original action." This takes care of such situations as where a
second mortgagee is made defendant in a foreclosure proceeding
and wishes to file a cross-claim against the mortgagor in order to
secure a personal judgment for the indebtedness and foreclose his
lien. A claim of this sort by the second mortgagee may not neces-
sarily arise out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject
matter of the original action under the terms of original Rule
13 (g).
Rule 14-Third Party Practice
The provisions of Rule 14 (a) which relate to the impleading
of a third party who is or may be liable to the plaintiff have been
deleted by the proposed amendment. The third sentence of 14 (a)
has been expanded to clarify the right of the third-party defendant
to assert any defenses which the third-party plaintiff may have to
,the plaintiff's claim. This protects the impleaded third-party de-
fendant where the third-party plaintiff fails or neglects to assert
a proper defense to the plaintiff's action. A new sentence has also
been inserted giving the third-party defendant the right to assert
directly against the original plaintiff any claim arising out of the
transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the plain-
tiff's claim against the third-party plaintiff. This permits all
claims arising out of the same transaction or occurrence to be-heard
and determined in the same action.
Rule 24-Intervention
Rule 24 (a) is modified to permit intervention of right when
the applicant is so situated as to be adversely affected by the dis-
position of property subject to the control or disposition of the
court or an officer thereof. This covers a situation wherein the
property is not in the actual custody of a court or its officers, but
the control or disposition of the property is lodged in the court
wherein the action is pending.
The addition to Rule 24 (b), relating to Permissive Interven-
tion, allows the intervention of governmental officers or agencies in
proper cases and thus avoids the exclusionary construction of the
original rule.
Rule 25-Substitution of Parties
Federal Rule 25 (a) requires substitution of parties because of
death, within two years from the death. As originally adopted in
Colorado, the two year limitation was omitted from this rule. A
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majority of the committee thought that Federal and state practice
should conform in this regard. Hence, an amendment to the state
rule is recommended to bring about conformity.
Rule 26-Depositions Pending Action
Rule 26 (b) 'relates to the scope of examination on depositions.
The amendment adds a sentence to the effect that inadmissibility
of the testimony is not a ground for objection if the testimony
sought is reasonable calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible
evidence. This makes clear the broad scope of examination which
may cover not only evidence for use at the trial, but also matters
which themselves are inadmissible in evidence but which will lead
to the discovery of admissible evidence. Thus, hearsay, while in-
admissible itself, may suggest testimony which properly may be
proved.
Rule 28-Persons Before Whom Depositions May Be Taken
Language is added to Rule 28 (a) to permit the court to ap-
point a person before whom a deposition may be taken. This is to
take care of the occasional situation in which depositions must be
taken at an isolated place where there is no one readily available
who has the power to administer oaths and take testimony accord-
ing to the terms of the rule as originally stated. In addition the
amendment affords a more convenient method of securing deposi-
tions in the case where state lines intervene between the location of
various witnesses otherwise rather closely grouped. The amend-
ment insures that the person appointed shall have adequate power
to perform his duties.
Rule 30-Depositions Upon Oral Examination
Orders for protection of parties and deponents in connection
with the discovery procedure are provided by Rule 30 (b). The
criticism has been made that the discovery procedure can be used
for harassment and delay. The amendment makes clear the intent
of the rule that the protective provisions shall be liberally con-
strued to prevent unnecessary inconvenience, expense, and delay:
Rule 33-Interrogatories To Parties
Rule 33 on interrogatories is amended in several respects.
One addition insures that only the answers to the objectionable
interrogatories may be deferred, and that the answers to inter-
rogatories not objectionable shall be forthcoming within the time
prescribed by the rule. Under the original wording, answers to
all interrogatories might be withheld until objections are deter-
mined, even though objections were made to only a few of the in-
terrogatories. Another proposed change makes the scope of ex-
amination as broad as that under Rule 26 (b) on depositions. There
is no reason why interrogatories should be more limited than de-
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positions, particularly when the former represent an inexpensive
means of securing useful information. The protective provisions
of Rule 30 (b) are made applicable to interrogatories. Further, the
amended rule permits either interrogatories after a deposition or a
deposition after interrogatories.
. Rule 34-Discovery and Production of Documents
Changes in Rule 34 on the subject of discovery and production
of documents correlate the scope of inquiry permitted thereunder
with that provided in Rule 26 (b) on depositions and thus remove
any ambiguities created by the former differences in language. The
proposed amendment also makes certain that the person in whose
custody, possession, or control the evidence reposes may have the
benefit of the applicable protective orders stated in Rule 30 (b).
Rule 36-Admission of Facts
Modifications of Rule 36 (a), referring to requests for admis-
sion, bring that rule in line with Rules 26 (a) and 33. There is no
reason why these rules should not be treated alike.
Rule 41-Dismissal of Actions
The change in Rule 41 (a) (1), relating to voluntary dismissal,
gives the service of a motion for summary judgment by the adverse
party the same effect in preventing unlimited dismissal as was
originally given only to the service of an answer. A motion for
summary judgment may be forthcoming prior to answer, and if
well taken will eliminate the necessity for an answer.
The next proposed amendment is to Rule 41 (b) (1) on
involuntary dismissal. In some cases tried without a jury, where
at the close of plaintiff's evidence the defendant moves for dis-
missal under 41 (b) on the ground that plaintiff's evidence is in-
sufficient for recovery, the plaintiff's own evidence may be con-
flicting or present questions of credibility. In ruling on defendant's
motion, questions arise as to the function of the judge in evaluating
the testimony and whether findings should be made if the motion
is sustained. The added sentence in this rule incorporates the view
that on such a motion in a non-jury case, the judge may pass on
conflicts of evidence and credibility. If he performs that function
of evaluating the testimony ana grants the motion on the merits,
findings are required.
Rule 45-Subpoena
Rule 45 (d) covers the subject of subpoena for taking deposi-
tions. A sentence is added to subdivision (d) (1) to give the sub-
poena for documents or tangible things the same scope as provided
in Rule 26 (b), thus promoting -uniformity. The changes in sub-
division (d) (2) give the court the same power in the case of
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residents of the state as is conferred in the case of non-residents,
and permit the court to fix a place for attendance which may be
more convenient and accessible for the parties than that specified
in the rule.
Rule 47--Jurors
Rule 47 (h) on peremptory challenges has caused confusion
in cases involving third-party defendants or intervenors. The pro-
posed amendment permits the court in its discretion to allow per-
emptory challenges to such parties.
Rule 52-Findings By The Court
The amended Rule 52 (a) makes clear that the requirement
for findings of fact and conclusions of law thereon applies in a
case with an advisory jury. This removes an ambiguity in the
rule as originally stated but carries into effect what has been con-
sidered its intent. Two sentences added at the end of the rule
eliminate certain difficulties which have arisen concerning findings
and conclusions. The first of the two sentences permits findings
of fact and conclusions of law to appear in an opinion or memo-
randum of decision. The findings should represent the judge's
own determination and not the long, often argumentative state-
ments of successful counsel. Consequently, they should be a part
of the judge's opinion and decision, either stated therein or stated
separately. But the judge need only make brief, definite, pertinent
findings and conclusions upon the contested matters; there is no
necessity for overelaboration of detail or particularization of facts.
Rule 54-Judgment; Costs
Rule 54 (b), judgment at various stages, was originally
adopted in view of the wide scope and possible content of the
newly created "civil action" in order to avoid the possible injus-
tice of a delay in judgment of a distinctly separate claim to await
adjudication of the entire case. It was not designed to overturn
the rule against piece-meal disposal of litigation. In practice, situ-
ations have arisen where a court has entered what the parties have
thought amounted to a judgment, although a trial remained to be
had on other claims similar or identical with those disposed of.
Hence, the question of the finality of a partial judgment has arisen.
The amendment retains the rule against piece-meal disposal of
litigation but gives discretionary power to afford a remedy in the
infrequent harsh case.
Rule 56-Summary Judgment
The amendment to Rule 56 (a), relating to a motion by a
claimant for a summary judgment, allows a claimant to move for
a summary judgment at any time after the expiration of 20 days
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from the commencement of the action or after service of a motion
for summary judgment by the adverse party. The changes are in
the interest of more expeditious litigation. The 20 day period,.
as provided, gives the defendant an opportunity to secure coun-
sel and determine a course of action. But in a case where the
defendant himself files a motion for summary judgment within
that time, there is no reason to restrict the plaintiff and the
amended rule so provides.
The amendment to Rule 56 (c), relating to procedure on mo-
tion for summary judgment, makes it clear that although the
question of recovery depends on the amount of damages, the sum-
mary judgment rule is applicable and summary judgment may be
granted in a proper case. If the case is not fully adjudicated it
may be dealt with as provided in subdivision (d) of Rule 56, and
the right to summary recovery determined by a preliminary
order, interlocutory in character, and the precise amount of re-
covery left for trial.
Rule 58-Entry and Satisfaction of Judgment
Rule 58 (a) refers to the entry of judgment. The substitu-
tion of the more inclusive phrase "all relief be denied" for the
words "there be no recovery," makes it clear that the clerk shall
enter the judgment forthwith in the situations specified without
awaiting the filing of a formal judgment approved by the court.
The phrase "all relief be denied" covers such cases as where judg-
ment is against the plaintiff in an action to quiet title, or in an
action for a declaratory judgment, or in an action for the con-
struction of a will, or in any other action where a judgment for
money is not sought.
Rule 59-New Trials
Subdivision (e) has been added to Rule 59 to make clear that
the trial court possesses the power to alter or amend a judgment
after its entry. The subdivision deals only with alteration or
amendment of the original judgment in a case and does not relate
to a judgment upon motion as provided in Rule 50 (b).
Rule 60-Relief From Judgment or Order
The amendment to Rule 60 (a) permits the correction of cleri-
cal mistakes after the docketing of a case on appeal, provided
leave of the appellate court is obtained. It eliminates any conten-
tion that upon the taking of a writ of error the trial court loses
its power to act.
When originally promulgated, the rules contained a number
of provisions, including those found in 60 (b), describing the prac-
tice by a motion to obtain relief from judgments. These rules,
coupled with the reservation in 60 (b) of the right to entertain
DICTA
a new action to relieve a party from a judgment, were generally
supposed to cover the field. Since the rules have been in force.
the question has been raised whether the use of bills of review,
coram nobis, or audita querela, to obtain relief from final judg-
ments is still proper, and whether various remedies of this kind
still exist although they are not mentioned in the rules and the
practice is not prescribed in the rules. The reconstruction of Rule
60 (b) has for one of its purposes a clarification of this situation.
Two types of procedure to obtain relief from judgments are spe-
cified in the amended rules. One procedure is by motion in the
court and in the action in which the judgment was rendered. The
other procedure is by a new or independent action to obtain relief
from a judgment, which action may or may not be begun in the
court which rendered the judgment. Various rules, such as the
one dealing with a motion for new trial and for amendment of
judgments, Rule 59, one for amended findings, Rule 52, and one
for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, Rule 50 (b), and in-
cluding the provisions of Rule 60 (b) as amended, prescribe the
various types of cases in which the practice by motion is per-
mitted. In each case there is a limit upon the time within which
resort to a motion is permitted, and this time limit may not be
enlarged under Rule 6 (b). If the right to make a motion is lost
by the expiration of the time limits fixed in these rules, the only
other procedural remedy is by a new or independent action to set
aside a judgment upon those principles which have heretofore been
applied in such an action. Where the independent action is re-
sorted to,, the limitations of time are those of laches or statutes
of limitations. Fraud, whether intrinsic or extrinsic, misrepre-
sentation, or other misconduct of an adverse party are express
grounds for relief by motion under amended subdivision (b). There
is no sound reason for their exclusion. The incorporation of fraud
and the like within the scope of the rule also removes confusion as
to the proper procedure.
Rule 65-Inunctions
Rule 65 (c) covers security in injunction actions. The amend-
ment provides that a surety on an injunction bond submits himself
to the jurisdiction of the court wherein the action is pending.
Liability may be enforced on motion without the necessity of an
independent action.
Rule 66-Receivers
The amendment to Rule 66 prohibits the dismissal of an action
in which a receiver has been appointed without an order of court.
A party should not be permitted to oust the court and its officer
without the consent of the court.
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Rule 68-Offer of Judgment
The proposed change in Rule 68 would permit more than one
offer of judgment. In the case of successive offers not accepted,
the offeror is saved the costs incurred after the making of the offer
which was equal to or greater than the judgment ultimately ob-
tained. These provisions should encourage settlements and avoid
protracted litigation.
Rule 98-Place of Trial
Rule 98 (e) is completely rewritten to cover motions for
change of venue. The amendment to Rule 12 (b) eliminates im-
proper venue as a ground for motion because in Colorado improper
venue is not a defense. The manner of presenting the question of
improper venue will be covered by 98 (e) if the proposed amend-
ment is adopted.
Rule 111-Writ of Error
A suggested change in Rule 111 (f), specification of points,
makes it clear that a defendant in error shall file cross-specifica-
tions if he desires to object to any action of the trial- court. This
clarifies the rule by bringing it in line with applicable decisions
of the Colorado Supreme Court.
Rule 120--Orders Authorizing Sales Under Powers
Rule 120 (b) relates to orders authorizing sales of real estate
under powers contained in a deed of trust. The amendment makes
the language of the rule follow more closely the language of Sec.
64, Ch. 40, Colo. Stat. Ann. (1935). It is made clear that the clerk
in proceeding under the rule shall mail notices to the same persons
at the same addresses as shall the public trustee in proceeding
under Sec. 64.
Deletion of the Prefix "C"
The committee further recommended that the prefix "C" be
deleted wherever it appears in the rules. At the present the use of
this prefix is not uniform or consistent and is confusing. The com-
mittee notes are sufficient to advise the practitioner in all cases
where explanation is desirable as to source of rule or as to inter-
dependence of rules. While the committee was divided on this
proposal, it would seem that if the "C" designation is retained,
some effort should be made to attain uniformity of usage.
CONCLUSION
It is hoped that this attempt to familiarize Colorado attorneys
with the more important rule changes recommended by the Supreme
Court's Rules Committee will point up the need for their adoption.
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Besides their intrinsic value in improving the logic and justice of
civil procedure, these amendments are necessary if Colorado is to
achieve one of the basic goals for which the Rules were adopted
in the first place-substantial uniformity in state and Federal prac-
tice. If no effort is made to accept and make effective worthwhile
improvements in the system of civil procedure it inaugurated in
1941, Colorado will be neither a Rules nor a Code state, neither
fish nor fowl.
While there has been some complaint as to the use and
application of the Rules-or perhaps more accurately, their non-
use-available evidence seems to indicate that the civil procedure
provided in the Rules has met with satisfaction among the large
majority of Colorado lawyers. Clearly, too, the Rules have in-
creased the opportunity of the general public to obtain a closer
approximation of real justice in our courts.
AVERAGE-SIZE ESTATE PROBLEMS
SUBJECT OF MAY INSTITUTE
CHARLES H. HAINES, JR., AND COLLABORATORS
of the Denver Bar
Emphasizing the lawyer-like handling of the average estate,
another Denver Bar Association Institute will be held on two suc-
cessive Tuesday evenings, May 16 and May 23, in the Chamber of
Commerce Dining Room (again without dinner), 1726 Champa
Street, beginning promptly at 8:00 p.m.
Judge C. Edgar Kettering of Denver's County Court will 'act
as chairman and moderator of both sessions.
Subjects and speakers have been announced as follows:
May 16: Will Drafting for Average-Sized Estates (or, Brother,
Skip the Trust) -Hubert D. Henry.
Simple Devices for the Transfer of Assets Without Ad-
ministration (or, How Far Can You Go With a Bond
and Affidavit?) -Merrill A. Knight.
May 23: Practical Problems in the Administration of Aver-
age Estates (or, Taxes Aren't Your Only Worry)-
Barkley L. Clanahan.
Estate Auditing (or, Why Can't Lawyers Add?) -John
L. Griffith.
A clinic and refresher for your small estate problems!
Come with your questions. Parking available across Champa Street.
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TWENTY-SIX YEARS UNDER THE COLORADO
DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS ACT
WILLIAM E. MEYERS
o1 the Denver Bar *
With the purpose in mind "... to settle and afford relief from
uncertainty and insecurity with respect to rights, status, or other
legal relations,"1 the 1923 General Assembly of Colorado enacted
the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act. It is believed that the
value of this Act, both past and future, is sufficient to warrant a
review of the seventy cases reported since that time in an effort
to determine the applicability of the Act to future litigation.
The purpose of the Act was clearly remedial.2 The primary
distinction between a case instituted under this Act and any other
litigation is that in the former no objection can be made on the
ground that further relief is not or could not be claimed.3 Further-
more, although an actual, justiciable controversy must exist before
the courts can take jurisdiction of an action for declaratory relief,
it is not necessary that one of the parties litigant has sustained an
actual injury.4 Hence, the parties to a contract, engaged in a dis-
pute over its legal effect, may have a judicial determination of their
rights prior to an actual breach ;5 an insurer may have his rights
declared prior to an actual claim for payments by the beneficiary ;6
a taxpayer who is threatened with assessment may bring an action
to have his rights and duties declared under an applicable tax
statute prior to paying under protest.' These are only a few ex-
amples of the value and practicability of the declaratory judgment.
To construe the Act as requiring a breach of duty as a condition
precedent to bringing the action would clearly defeat the purpose
of the Act.8 Herein, however, lies the primary difficulty in applying
the Declaratory Judgments Act to any given set of facts. For un-
less there are adverse parties and unless there exists either an
actual controversy or the ripening seeds of one, the courts will
consider the question hypothetical, moot, or in the nature of an
advisory opinion, and they will hold that any determination of such
a question will constitute an extra-judicial or non-judicial function.9
These requisites were firmly established in Colorado by a very
Written while a student at the University of Denver College of Law.
COLO. STAT. ANN., C. 93, § 89 (1935).
2 It is asserted, however, by some writers that granting declaratory relief is within
the inherent powers of the courts without statute, ANDERSON, DEcLARATORY JUDGMENTS
(1941).
:COLO. STAT. ANN., c. 93, § 78 (1935).
'BORCHARD, DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS (1934).
COLO. STAT. ANN., C. 93, § 80 (1935) ; Highland Sales v. Roberts, 104 Colo. 222,
90 P. 2d 2 (1939).
'Aetna Life Ins. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227 (1937).
'Armstrong v. Carmen Distributing, 108 Colo. 223, 115 P. 2d 386 (1941).
'COLO. STAT. ANN., c. 93. § 91 (1935) ; BORCHARD, DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS (1Q34).
'Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 846 (1911).
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well-reasoned opinion by Justice Burke in Gabriel v. Board of
Regents.10 This action was brought under the following provision:
"Any person interested under a ... writing constituting a contract
... may have determined any question of construction or validity
arising under the instrument . . ."11 Plaintiff's assignor had
entered into a contract with the Board of Regents of the University
of Colorado whereby the Board was to lease him certain land. The
suit was instituted three days after execution of the contract for
the purpose of seeking a declaration as to whether or not the
Board of Regents had the power to make this lease. The complaint
failed to allege that the validity of said contract had been ques-
tioned, and the Supreme Court concluded that there was no justici-
able controversy over which the court could assume jurisdiction.
The court continued by saying:
This Act (Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act) was
not intended to repeal the statute prohibiting judges from
giving legal advice, nor to impose duties of the profession
on courts, nor to provide advance judgments as the basis
for commercial enterprise, nor to settle mere academic ques-
tions.
With this decision in mind, it is important for attorneys who
contemplate u~ing this Act to determine as nearly as possible what
constitutes an actual controversy, or the ripening seeds of one, for
the objection of lack of justiciability is always present as a defense
to a declaratory action. Therefore, it is necessary to review the
reported Colorado decisions in order to ascertain what does, in fact,
constitute justiciability.
EFFECTIVELY USED TO DETERMINE CONTRACTUAL RIGHTS
The action has been used very effectively in Colorado in order
to ascertain rights under a written contract prior to an actual
breach, 1 2 or even after breach when an action for damages or
specific performance could have been sustained. 13 It should also be
noted that, although the statute 14 specifically authorizes actions
under "writings" constituting a contract, one case in Colorado has
sustained an action for interpretation of an oral contract, 15 indi-
cating a liberal application of the Act. On the basis of these deci-
sions, the court apparently feels that a controversy is justiciable
under this section if the parties to the instrument actually challenge
its validity,' or disagree as to their rights and duties under the
instrument 17 or as to the legal effect of the contract.'8 Of course,
1083 Colo. 582, 267 P. 407 (1928).
11 COLO. STAT. ANN., C. 93, § 79 (1935).
1 COLO. STAT. ANN., C. 93, § 80 (1935) ; Equitable Life v. Hemenover, 100 Colo. 231,
67 P. 2d 80 (1937).
'1 Tellman v. Smith, 112 Colo. 217, 148 P. 2d 581 (1944) ; Bennett's. Inc. v. Krogh,
115 Colo. 18, 168 P. 2d 554 (1946).
14 COLO. STAT. ANN., C. 93, § 80 (1935).
15 Highland Sales v. Roberts, 104 Colo. 222, 90 P. 2d 2 (1939).
1" Highland Sales v. Roberts, supra, note 15.
11 Bennett's, Inc. v. Krogh, supra, note 13.
"Todd v. Elkins, 101 Colo. 269, 72 P. 2d 696 (1938).
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if there has been an actual breach, there can be no denial of just-
iciability. 19
USE IN CONNECTION WITH WILLS AND TRUSTS
In an action for construction of a will, the Supreme Court in-
dicated that a court of general jurisdiction had this power even
prior to passage of the Act.2 0 The court further stated, however,
that it would not entertain questions which had not yet arisen in
the administration of the trust and would refuse to answer specu-
lative inquiries.
USED TO TEST CONSTITUTIONALITY OF A LAW
In several cases, the constitutionality of statutes and ordin-
ances has been attacked.2 1 Petitioner, however, must be an adverse
party and have sufficient ipterest to attack the statute.2 2 Moreover,
as in every other action for a declaratory decree, there must be a
justiciable controversy.2 3 The fact that both parties to a declara-
tory action may concede the appropriateness of the procedure would
not seem to preclude the court from requiring this element; how-
ever, the court apparently refused to recognize this requirement in
McNichols v. Denver.2 4 An ordinance was passed by the city of
Denver providing, in effect, that when a vacancy was created in a
Justice of Peace Court, the mayor could transfer jurisdiction to
municipal judges. Shortly after passage of the ordinance, the city
auditor brought an action against the city to test its validity. The
district court entertained the action and declared the ordinance
valid, the result being reversed by the Supreme Court without ques-
tioning justiciability. Justice Burke, however, in a highly practical
and well-reasoned concurring opinion, pointed out that no legal
right, status, or other legal relation was uncertain, that no vacancy
had occurred, nor had any question of applying this ordinance been
raised. Justice Burke took the position that the court should not
"sit to adjudicate every street squabble about what the law might 25
be if the impossible happened, simply because the disputants might
so stipulate. ' ' 2 He clearly considered this case hypothetical. His
conclusion seems correct.
27
DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS USEFUL IN TAX FIELD
One of the most effective uses of the declaratory judgment is
in the field of taxation. A taxpayer is able to have his rights liti-
gated under applicable tax statutes prior to an actual payment of
19 Tellman v. Smith, aupra, note 13.
=Mulcahy v. Johnston, 80 Colo. 499, 252 P. 816 (1927).
McNichols v. Denver, 109 Colo. 269, 124 P. 2d 601 (1942).
=Rinn v. Bedford. 102 Colo. 475, 84 P. 2d 827 (1938).
"Gabriel v. Board of Regents, aupra, note 10.
24109 Colo. 269, 124 P. 2d 601 (1942).
2Italics added.
2McNichols v. Denver, aupra, at 276 et seq.
27 In some jurisdictions, however, if the question was of great public interest, the
rule of justiciability has been relaxed. See, ANDERSON, DECLARATORY JUDOMENTS, p. 43
(1941).
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the tax.28 Declaratory judgment actions in this field have been in-
stituted primarily to determine the status of the taxpayer 29 or the
classification of articles under a statute.30 The actions were just-
iciable under the theory that the state treasurer had either made a
demand on the taxpayer or had issued a directive including the un-
certain articles. An action will not lie, however, if the ordinance
in question bas not yet been passed.
31
MISCELLANEOUS APPLICATION OF ACT
While the foregoing uses of the Act in Colorado have perhaps
occurred more frequently, actions have been brought under the
Act for various other purposes. Such other actions in the Colorado
courts for declaratory decrees include those involving (1) declara-
tion of status and rights under applicable statutes and ordinances,
32
(2) construction of statutes and ordinances, 3 3 (3) questions of
titles and marketability,3 4 (4) power of governmental bodies, 35 (5)
rights of insurers and beneficiaries under policies and statutes,3 6
(6) rights of holders of government and municipal bonds, 37 and (7)
construction of oil and gas leases.
3
The use of declaratory judgments action in Colorado has not
been extensive, but under the Federal act of the same nature, many
varying causes of action have been instituted. The intent of the Act
as passed in Colorado is that it be interpreted in the light of Federal
decisions. 39
LIBERAL INTERPRETATION GIVEN BY SUPREME COURT
What then constitutes justiciability? When are the seeds of
the controversy sufficiently "ripe" to sustain an action for a dec-
laratory decree? Although judicial precedents may guide us in our
inquiry in a given factual situation, no all-inclusive answer may be
given to these questions. Although we may say facts "indicative
of threatened litigation in the immediate future which seems un-
avoidable ' 40 constitute the "ripening seeds" of a controversy, the
final determination of a given set of facts can be determined only
by the courts. One consideration to keep in mind, however, is that
23See, San Luis Power v. Trujillo, 93 Colo. 385, 26 P. 2d 537 (1933), in which the
court held the Declaratory Judgments Act constitutional, saying, "Preventive relief is
a matter of judicial function and is res judicata as to the issues presented." Bennett's
Inc. v. Carpenter, 111 Colo. 63, 137 P. 2d 780 (1943).
2' See, San Luis Power v. Trujillo, supra, note 28.
=
5
Bedford v. Johnston, 102 Colo. 203, 78 P. 2d 373 (1938).
"Denver v. Denver Land Co., 85 Colo. 198, 274 P. 743 (1928), citing Gabriel v.
Board of Regents, supra, note 10.
2Washington Co. High School District v. Board of Commissions, 85 Colo.. 72, 273
P. 879 (1928) ; Smith Printing v. Young, 103 Colo. 199, 85 P. 2d 39 (1939). The latter
case contains an excellent dissent by Burke on the issue of justiciability.
"Colorado and Utah Coal v. Walter, 75 Colo. 489, 226 P. 864 (1923).
. Union Colony v. Gallie, 104 Colo. 46, 88 P. 2d 120 (1939).
u Montgomery v. Denver, 102 Colo. 427, 80 P. 2d 434 (1938).
"Continental Ins. v. Cochran, 89 Colo. 462, 4 P. 2d 308 (1931).
7Employers' Mutual v. Board of County Commissioners, 102 Colo. 177, 78 P. 2d
380 (1938).
NHill v. Stanolind Oil, 119 Colo. 477, 205 P. 2d 643 (1949).
S COLO. STAT. ANN., C. 93, § 91 (1935) ; for a comprehensive review of federal cases
see, ANDERSON, DECLARATORy JUDGMENTS (1941).
4°In re Cryan's Estate, 301 Pa. 386, 152 A. 675 (1930).
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in the past the Colorado Supreme Court has rejected less than 10
per cent of the approximately seventy actions for declaratory relief.
This would seem to indicate a tendency on the part of the court to
interpret the statute quite liberally and, in some instances, even to
disregard the question of justiciability unless it is raised in the
briefs.
41
Some relatively concrete observations can be made, however,
as follows: an action brought uider the Declaratory Judgments
Act is tried in the same manner as any other action brought under
the rules of civil procedure;42 it is res judicata as to the issues
presented ;43 and any decree rendered can be presented for further
relief when it is necessary. 4 I Furthermore, although the cases are
in hopeless conflict, the more liberal rule seems to be that an action
for a declaratory decree should be entertained even though another
remedy exists.
45
Although some critics have asserted that the declaratory judg-
ment is academic and is of little practical value, it is believed that
its uses as pointed out in this paper have in some way indicated
the practicability of this action. 46 This practicability was foreseen
by Congressman Gilbert in debate on the first Federal declaratory
judgments bill when he said, "Under the present law you take a
step in the dark and then turn on the light to see if you stepped into
a hole. Under the declaratory judgment law you turn on the light
and then take the step. ' 47
Personals
Chief Justice Benjamin C. Hilliard made the principal address
at the seventeenth annual convention of the State Bar of Arizona
at Chandler, Ariz., on Saturday, April 15th. The Chief Justice's
address came as the climax to a three-day bar session which fea-
tured such other well-known speakers as Harold J. Gallagher,
president of the American Bar Association; Jerry Giesler, famous
Los Angeles attorney; and the Hon. Harry C. Westover, judge of
the U. S. District Court for the district of Southern California.
Raymond R. Brady, a former member of the Denver and Colo-
rado bar associations, is now engaged in general practice at 301
Utah Savings and Trust Bldg., Salt Lake City. Col. Brady, who
spent his youth in Alamosa and Salida, was Staff Judge Advocate
at Lowry Field for two years during the war. He retired from the
armed forces in November, 1946.
41 McNichols v. Denver, supra, note 24.
"Rule 57.
"San Luis Power v. Trujillo, supra, note 28.
,COLO. STAT. ANN., C. 93, § 85 (1935).
"This seems to be the rule in Colorado. See, Employer's Mutual v. Board of County
Commissioners, 102 Colo. 177, 78 P. 2d 380 (1938) ; Tellman v. Smith, supra, note 13;
Cf, Lueras v. Lafayette, 100 Colo. 124, 65 P. 2d 1431 (1937).
4' Today 60 per cent of all equity actions in England are adjudicated in this manner,
ANDERSON, DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS, § 1 et seq.




REORGANIZATION OF MUNICIPAL COURT
The Municipal and Justice Courts of the City and County of
Denver are going forward with their announced plans of renovat-
ing their quarters and streamlining their procedures.
New judges' chambers have been constructed for the two
Municipal and Justice Courts, located in the City and County Build-
ing, in the quarters formerly occupied by the clerks of the respective
divisions. These are the courts assigned to civil matters. The new
chambers are spacious, completely redecorated, and refurnished.
The old judges' chambers have been converted into attorneys'
conference rooms. These rooms also have been newly redecorated.
They provide a direct Denver telephone line for the use and con-
venience of the attorneys. Redecorating was extended to cover
courtrooms and lobbies, as well as chambers.
Another need was recognized in the civil division in the
matter of advising attorneys of funds paid into the courts. When
payments are now made in the satisfaction of judgments, the at-
torneys are no longer required to check to see if money is being
held. Under the new service, when a payment is made, the financial
clerk dispatches a post card to the attorney, notifying him of the
case and payment, and that a check drawn on the court registry
account may be obtained by presenting the card.
Further changes are planned in the Justice Court procedure
by simplifying forms wherever possible. It is proposed to in-
stitute a loose leaf type docket sheet, which is typewritten by the
clerical staff at the time of the filing of a case, and which, by its
loose leaf nature, can accompany the jacket to court, permitting the
judge to make all entries on the docket sheet in the first instance.
This will eliminate the duplication of effort and wasted time which
results from the procedure of posting the judgment on the jacket,
then posting on the docket, requiring the judge to sign a docket at
at a later date.
One of the most significant improvements in the Municipal
Court system is the adoption of a new docket system in the traffic
division. This was instituted on April 6, 1950. It is a simplified
system in which each case has its individual docket sheet, making
for greater convenience for attorneys and for the public. When a
traffic judge has an overloaded docket, the excess cases are trans-
ferred to another judge, with a minimum of coifusion and lost
time. It is planned to extend the new docket to the division han-
dling police matters.
The four municipal judges meet weekly to discuss problems,
proposed changes, and new ideas which have been presented for
their consideration. They welcome suggestions from the bar.
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EVERY DAY LAW FOR HIGH SCHOOL SENIORS
HON. EDWARD C. DAY
Denver District Court Judge and Member of the Public
Relations Committee, Denver Bar Association
A little known course at West Denver High School-probably
the only one of its kind in the country-is indirectly, and perhaps
by pure accident, doing more to foster good public relations for the
legal profession than many of the planned programs which the
writer has encountered.
Called "Every Day Law for Seniors," the lecture course is
part of the general education classes in the school. It was de-
signed, of course, to help prepare the seniors for better citizenship.
But its indirect effect has been to awaken an awareness in the
students of the vital part the legal profession plays in community
life. When these seniors have completed this course they have had
forcibly demonstrated to them that consultation with lawyers con-
cerning many every-day transactions of life is just as important as
'seeing their dentist twice a year."
The prime objectives in mind in presenting this lecture course
are (1) to increase students' knowledge concerning laws governing
their every-day living; (2) to show that law is a basic device for
protecting the individual and assuring his freedom; (3) to help
the students realize the limitations of their privileges, rights and
freedoms. in society so that they may live more harmoniously with
each other; (4) to show that people make laws and that laws are
not static but that they are dynamic.
To accomplish these objectives the students are told about:
1. Laws concerning parents' responsibility towards their
children.
2. Laws concerning education of children.
3. Laws concerning marriage and divorce.
4. Laws pertaining to insurance.
5. Laws pertaining to wills and inheritance.
6. Laws regulating travel and public conveyances.
7. Employer-employee relationships and the laws important
to those relationships.
8. Laws concerning the purchase of property, real and per-
sonal, with the related subject of chattel mortgages and landlord
and tenant relationships.
In addition to the general lectures by teachers who have spent
considerable time in research to present-but not to interpret-the
basic laws above enumerated, high ranking members of the legal
and other professions are called upon to give talks before the
groups. Thus invitations are extended to judges and attorneys to
discuss marriage and divorce laws, wills and estates, real property
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laws, etc.-to the Juvenile Court judge to discuss the responsibilities
of parents towards children and the laws concerning the compul-
sory education of children. Other discussions are led by insurance
men, labor leaders and real estate people. In addition, students visit
the marriage clinic and the courts.
Concerning the laws governing travel, the students get into re-
lated subjects involving hotel law and the various guest rules. They
enhance their knowledge by gathering up copies of hotel rules for
guests, samples of travel insurance policies, and by interviewing
hotel managers, bus drivers, airline pilots and train conductors.
It can be readily seen that such a program in the last year of
high school, whether the student goes on to college or goes immedi-
ately into the work-a-day world, makes for a better understanding
by those students of the high place the legal profession has in a com-
munity.
Aware of the success that this course has enjoyed at West
High School, the Denver Bar Association Committee on Public Re-
lations is undertaking to formulate a plan whereby similar courses
can be introduced in the parochial and public high schools in Den-
ver and in high schools throughout the state. It may be that be-
cause of fixed curricula it will take considerable time to work in
such a program in the other schools. A good start, however, can
be made next September by offering to the various schools lawyer-
lecturers to talk on the various subjects that demonstrate the every-
day laws which touch the citizen in everything he does throughout
the day. Starting with the vital statistics regulations which make
necessary the registration of his birth, and ending with the laws
and regulations governing where and how deep he shall be buried,
the citizen lives under statutory regulations and fundamental
legal and moral obligations so numerous that he is hardly conscious
of them as such and takes most of them for granted.
Many citizens go through their span of life getting into trouble,
losing money or paying usurious interest without ever obtaining
legal advice from its most logical source, the lawyer. But it is prob-
ably predictable that few, if any, of the future citizens from West
High School will ignore or shy away from the legal profession when
it comes to their daily transactions. So if our Committee on Public
Relations can expand its program to include the youth of the city,
all of them-potential clients of the future-will have a better
understanding of and a better feeling towards the legal profession.
That's the best kind of public relations.
The Book Trader's Corner
For historical purposes, or otherwise, James E. Taylor, Sharon
Springs, Kansas, attorney has "a set of Corpus Juris Cyc" for sale.
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"YOU.AND THE LAW" RADIO SERIES
AGAIN HITS COLORADO AIR LANES
During the latter part of April, the Colorado Bar Association
again took to the air with a new 13-week radio series over 11 Colo-
rado stations. This is a new "You and The Law" series of subjects,
but is the same type of public information program concerning the
law that proved so popular last year. The transcriptions are pro-
duced by the Rocky Mountain Radio Council under the supervision
of Past-President Win. Hedges Robinson, Jr., of the Public Rela-
tions Committee, and broadcast as a public service by the radio sta-
tions involved.
According to the experts, last year's "You and The Law" series
had an excellent listener response and enjoyed much popular sup-
port from housewives, workingmen, teachers and other laymen.
This year, not only are interesting legal problems being presented,
but the public's attention will be invited to state-wide problems of
judicial administration. The following are the subjects to be cov-
ered in the series, the first three or four of which already will have
been broadcast by the time this May Dicta appears:
1. The Bill of Rights and You.
2. Check and Double Check (banking).
3. Round Trip to Canon City (parole and probabation).
4. Divorce Unlimited.
5. What's in Another Name? (joint tenancy, tenancy in
common).
6. You Be The Judge (judicial reform).
7. So You're Going Into Business! (small business organiza-
tions).
8. Welcome Stranger! (citizenship).
9. Who's Crazy Now? (insanity).
10. It's Free But It Costs You (unauthorized practice).
11. It's In the Fine Print (contracts, loans).
12. Criminal Criminal Laws.
13. The Grand Jury.
The 1949 series was highly acceptable to the stations that car-
ried the program, and all expressed a desire to broadcast a new
series. Since there are now more than 30 stations in the state, how-
ever, the program could not be offered simultaneously to all. Ac-
cordingly, the Radio Council selected the initial 11, including
KFEL, Denver, for the best coverage. However, other stations will
have an opportunity to schedule the program later after the tran-
scriptions become available.
The main burden of promoting the programs rests with the
local bar associations. "Radio stations are giving this time to the
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legal profession," Mr. Robinson stated in a recent letter addressed
to local bar officers, "This is a courtesy and the highest type of
cooperation. The least we can do is to pitch in and turn out a real
job of local promotion to insure the largest possible listening aud-
ience. This is your program; its production is financed by your
dollars. It will be just as effective as you care to make it."
The radio stations carrying the program initially, the weekly
time of broadcast, and the dates when the first of the series started
are as follows:
Alamosa-KGIW, Wednesdays at 5:45 p.m. Began April 19
Boulder-KBOL, Sundays at 3:15 p.m. Began April 23
Colorado Springs-KVOR, Fridays at 10:15 p.m. Began
April 21
Denver-KFEL, Saturdays at 9:30 p.m. Began April 22
Ft. Collins-KCOL, Sundays at 7:15 p.m. Began April 23
Grand Junction-KEXO, Tuesdays at 7:45 p.m. Began April
18
Greeley-KYOU, Wednesdays at 7:15 a.m. Began April 19
La Junta-KOKO, Mondays at 7:45 p.m. Began April 17
Lamar-KLMR, Sundays at 9:15 p.m. Began April 23
Pueblo-KGHF, Mondays at 8:45 p.m. Began April 17
Trinidad-KSFT, Thursdays at 9:15 p.m. Began April 20
BOOK NOTICE
BASIC ACCOUNTING FOR LAWYERS, by Barton E. Ferst of
the Pennsylvania Bar.
This is the sixth in a group of concise, practical texts for gen-
eral practitioners published by the Committee on Continuing Legal
Education of the American Law Institute collaborating with the
American Bar Association (133 South 36th St., Philadelphia 4,
Penna.).
This deals not with any specific field of law but rather with
basic accounting. No lawyer can practice successfully in any field
of the law without the ability to read the accounting papers of
his average clients. Without that, he can hardly file an account
of an estate, participate in a bankruptcy proceeding, organize a
partnership or corporation, prepare income tax returns, or assist
in financing transactions. It is a fact that some knowledge of
accounting is essential for every lawyer.
This pamphlet attempts to provide the average lawyer with
such knowledge. It is an elementary text and does not deal with
any specific field of law but rather familiarizes the lawyer with
the elements and terminology of accounting procedures and state-
ments. The text concludes with an illustrative appendix of financial
statements and an analysis thereof, with a brief bibliography.
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CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS IN TAXATION
BY ALBERT J. GOULD AND KENNETH L. SMITH
of the Denver Bar
WHEN IS A PARTNERSHIP A TAXABLE ASSOCIATION?
In Western Construction Company, 14 T. C.. No. 55, the Tax
Court voted 8 to 7 to recognize a limited partnership, with the
seven dissenting judges holding that although a limited partnership
was formed exactly in accordance with a Washington state partner-
ship law, certain characteristics rendered the limited partnership
an association taxable as a corporation.
The Commissioner contended the partnership was taxable as
an association because it continued for ten years, the general part-
ners could admit additional limited partners, the management was
vested in the general partners, death did not terminate the partner-
ship so long as a general partner survived, and the partnership in-
terests could be transferred.
The majority followed Glensder Textile, 46 BTA 176, but even
though a limited partnership is formed strictly in accordance with
state law, it may be taxable as an association. This trend should
be watched closely.
PROPERTY SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT
The U. S. Supreme Court has granted certiorari in the Harris
case, a Second Circuit case decided December 22, 1949, which in-
volved the question Qf whether or not the transfer of property in
connection with settling property rights in a divorce matter may
be subject to gift tax. The decision in this matter can be very im-
portant and may clarify the confusion which followed the lower
court's decision in this case.
CLOSED CORPORATION TRANSACTIONS
The decision in Heat Bath Corporation, 14 T. C., No. 41, dem-
onstrates the necessity of having all business matters of a closed
corporation reduced to writing by competent expert draftsmen
whenever the rights of any of the controlling stockholders are in-
volved. This is so because all such transactions will be subjected to
the most careful scrutiny by taxing authorities, and any ambiguity
or suspicious circumstances will be resolved against the stock-
holder. Complete minutes and carefully drawn instruments, on
the other hand, will prevent unnecessary tax litigation.
DICTA
SALARY PAID TO EMPLOYEE'S WIDOW
Under Regulation 111, Sec. 29.22 (a) 2, an employer is per-
mitted to deduct a salary paid to the widow of an employee for a
reasonable time after his death, and this salary has not been con-
sidered taxable income to the widow under I.T. 3329, issued in 1939.
Now, the Bureau of Internal Revenue is about to hold that such
payments constitute taxable income to the widow, but it has not
yet determined whether to revoke the above regulation permitting
deduction by the employer.
SALE OF ASSETS RECEIVED ON LIQUIDATION
In U. S. v. Cumberland Public Service Company, 70 S. C. 280,
a taxpayer was successful in his contention that assets received
in liquidation of a corporation were sold by the controlling stock-
holders and not by the corporation. This decision was reached
even though negotiations regarding the sale had been entered into
between the purchaser and the shareholders before the liquidation,
and even though the directors had considered a sale and had re-
fused to have the corporation enter into a sales contract.
The Commissioner steadfastly has contended that where sale
negotiations precede the liquidation, the corporation will be held
to have made the sale, even though the sale in fact was made by
the shareholders after reecipt of the assets in liquidation. This
position, of course, would result in a double tax, one being paid
by the corporation on the profit received on the sale, and the other
being paid by the shareholder on receipt of the assets in liquidation.
In the Cumberland case, however, what may be a new approach
by the Supreme Court, namely a reference to the realities of the
transaction, appears for the first time in many years. In this case
the Commissioner's contention was denied, although the corpora-
tion attorney had advised the prospective purchaser that the di-
rectors of the corporation had determined that the corporation
would not sell the assets in question, but that the two controlling
stockholders were willing to enter into such contracts to become
operative after the liquidation of the corporation.
The Court pointed out that whatever may be the motive for
liquidation, Congress has imposed no tax on a corporation as a
penalty for liquidation. Consequently, a corporation may liquidate
or dissolve without subjecting itself to a corpGrate gains tax, even
though a primary motive is to avoid the burden of corporate tax-
ation.
The Court having found that the sale was made by the stock-
holders rather than the corporation after a genuine liquidation and
dissolution, the fact that a major motive of the shareholders in
liquidating the corporation was to reduce taxes was held to be
immaterial. Thus, for the first time in many years "motive to re-
duce taxes" has been disregarded in a Federal income tax case.
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THE REAPPRAISAL PROGRAM FOR DENVER*
HARVEY D. WILLSON
Director of Reappraisal and Assessments, City and County of Denver
Any attempt to discuss the reappraisal project within a 15
or 20 minute period requires at the outset a definition of the subject
matter to be presented. The subject offers an unending opportunity
to review each and every problem with which the assessor has
struggled during the last 50 or 60 years. I wish to asure you now
that I shall by-pass these problems and limit this discussion to the
following three points: (1) The assessor's responsibilities and the
favored taxpayer; (2) The need for the reappraisal program; and
(3) The probable effect on your tax bill. I will discuss briefly each
of these points.
THE ASSESSOR'S RESPONSIBILITY AND THE FAVORED TAXPAYER
State law places upon the assessor the duty to properly value
for assessment purposes land, improvements, and personal prop-
erty. This responsibility requires the assessor to encompass an
extremely broad area of appraisal work as may be seen from the
fact that the total assessed valuation of the three classes of prop-
erty in Denver amounts to $578,000,000, and the annual property
taxes total $30,000,000. The appraisal of land involves considera-
tion of value-influence factors relating to many uses represented
by areas such as: the single-family residential area, the multiple-
family residential area, the down-town commercial area, the neigh-
borhood shopping area, the business strip-streets (e.g. E. Colfax
and S. Broadway), the warehouse district area, and the industrial
area. In addition to these classes of land with their various sub-
divisions, there are other classes to consider, such as, tax-exempt
property and land owned by public utilities used for non-utility or
non-operating purposes.
The appraisal of improvements involves consideration of value-
influence factors relating to at least 20 different use type buildings.
These 20 classes must be further considered according to type and
quality of construction. In addition to the numerous classifications
of buildings for which proper assessment formulae must be de-
veloped, there is the ever present problem of depreciation, including
physical, functional, and economic depreciation.
* An address made before the April 10 meeting of the Denver Bar Association. Be-
cause of the timeliness and importance of Mr. Willson's subject, the editors of DICTA
decided to publish his remarks for the benefit of those members who were not present
as a result of the mix-up on meeting dates.
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The appraisal of personal property involves consideration of
numerous problems relating to the evaluation of household goods,
business furniture and fixtures, business machinery and equipment,
and merchandise inventories. The time required merely to enumer-
ate these problems, each of which requires a decision, would take
considerable time and space; consequently, I will not burden you
with the details.
The broad area of appraisal work outlined above requires many
personal judgments on the part of the assessor. For this reason,
the favored taxpayer presents an extremely difficult problem. The
manipulation of assessed valuations has been a common practice
wherever political machines have controlled the assessor's office.
There are, however, several safeguards that the taxpayer of a com-
munity should insist upon. Among these are the requirements that
(1) the assessor's office be required to maintain adequate records
which show all changes in assessed valuations and the reasons for
such changes; (2) the assessor's office be audited by an independent
public accountant as carefully as the county treasurer's office is
audited; and (3) the report of the independent public accountant
be made a public record and full publicity given to all important
changes in assessed valuations and exemptions together with the
reasons for such changes.
This phase of the assessor's work has been outlined first so
that they may be kept in mind later when the need for the reap-
praisal is considered.
NEED FOR THE REAPPRAISAL PROGRAM
The reappraisal program will cost the city of Denver approxi-
mately $350,000. This amounts to approximately $.85 per capita.
Based on the work completed to date, it is apparent that taxes col-
lected the first year from property that has never been on the tax
rolls, or has been assessed at an extremely low value, will more than
pay for the reappraisal.
Since we are spending $350,000 on this project, the question
of whether or not the program is needed should be analyzed. We
believe that it is definitely needed for several basic reasons. In the
first place, no systematic review of assessments has been made dur-
ing the last 25 years. Property was reappraised in 1924 and 1925,
and for the most part, these values have been carried on the tax
rolls up to the present time. This means that in the vast majority
of cases valuations have not been adjusted to reflect the changes
caused by the economic development of the city. Another very im-
portant reason is that there is, in the assessor's office, an accumula-
tion of clerical errors, both intentional and unintentional, resulting
from 25 years of manual posting. More than 200,000 manual post-
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ings are made each year without a mathematical control over the
correctness of such postings. A third reason for the need of the
reappraisal is that buildings have been constructed in Denver which
have never been on the tax rolls. Improvements and additions have
been made on properties which have never been reflected in valua-
tions. Finally, the General Assembly, through the State Tax Com-
mission, has ordered all counties to reappraise real property.
Cooperating with this state-wide project will definitely benefit
Denver.
A few actual illustrations will serve to emphasize the need for
a systematic review of assessments. In 1948, we analyzed approxi-
mately 1,000 actual sales of real estate made in July and August
of that year and related the sale prices to their respective assessed
valuations. The study showed that the ratio of assessed valuations
to sales prices varied from 7 to 110 per cent. This means that some
very inequitable situations exist. Lots assessed years ago at $12.50
are still being carried at that figure notwithstanding the fact that
they are selling today for $500, $600, and $700. A pair of lots on
East Colfax sold several months ago for $12,000; however, they
were assessed at $800, about six and one-half per cent of today's
value. A piece of industrial land which was assessed for $1,000
recently sold for $22,000.
Large residential dwellings have been converted into apart-
ment houses and rooming houses without any adjustment of the
obselescence which had been allowed on the building as a one-family
dwelling. One such building sold a few weeks ago for $72,000; it
is assessed for $5,300.
With respect to clerical errors over which there is no mathe-
matical control, one year ago, a taxpayer called to our attention a
clerical error of $100,000 which increased his assessed valuation.
The number of other clerical errors made in favor of the taxpayer
during the last 25 years is impossible to determine. With regard to
buildings constructed and not on the tax rolls, we have found,
during the past few months, three warehouses which had been con-
structed in 1942, 1943, and 1946 and which had never been placed
on the tax rolls.
These are only a few actual examples of the urgent need for a
complete physical inventory of property in Denver assessed on a
fair and uniform basis.
THE PROBABLE EFFECT ON YOUR TAX BILL
From the beginning of this project, Mayor Newton and I have
stated that the revenue problem of the city will be entirely divorced
from the reappraisal program. The project is strictly an equaliza-
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tion program designed to place a uniform and equitable assessment
on all property. The total assessed valuation within the city after
the reappraisal, except for new construction, will not exceed the
total assessed valuation of 1949. In other words, whereas the total
valuation will not increase, the equalization within this total may
increase the assessed valuation of certain property, and at the
same time, the assessed valuation of other property will be de-
creased. The State Tax Commission, in its program for state-wide
reappraisal, has selected the values of the year 1941 as the guide
to be used in determining the level of assessed valuations for re-
appraisal purposes. Denver and other counties are following this
recommendation.
It is difficult to state, except in a very general way, the effect
of the reappraisal program on the assessed valuation of real prop-
erty in Denver. However, we do know that certain changes will
take place. For the majority of property owners, the reappraisal
program will probably not change the assessed valuation of their
property, either up or down, more than four or five per cent. How-
ever, taxpayers who have constructed garages, added rooms, or
made major improvements on their property, without having
secured a building permit, may expect to have these items added
to their valuations. Persons who have purchased land in an area
which has had considerable economic development in the last ten
years should expect an increase in the assessed valuation of such
land. Owners of large residential buildings which have been con-
verted to commercial uses may expect an increase equal to the
obsolescence factor which had been allowed in the past. Property
owners who have been under-assessed because of clerical or other
errors may expect to have these errors corrected. On the other
hand, owners of property in areas which have declined on a rela-
tive basis may expect a reduction in valuation.
We have recognized for some time that the assessed valuations
of merchandise inventories, machinery, and equipment, where fully
assessed, have been unduly high when compared with real prop-
erty. The reappraisal program will make adjustments on this class
of property.
REVIEW OF ASSESSMENTS
Whatever the effect may be on your tax bill, I know that you
are interested in the opportunities for reviewing the valuation.
One of the basis policies of Mayor Newton's administration has
been to encourage citizen participation in all functions of the city
government. To accomplish this objective in the reappraisal pro-
ject, three advisory committees have been appointed. These com-
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mittees are (1) a general advisory committee (selected by 21 civic
and professional groups) with a membership of 21 persons rep-
resenting a cross section of the city's taxpayers, (2) a technical
advisory committee consisting of six men experienced in Denver
real estate values, and (3) a business, personal property advisory
committee selected by the Colorado Society of Certified Public Ac-
countants and the Denver chapter of NACA.
These committees will review the general program of the re-
appraisal project and also the more technical phases of the pro-
gram. This procedure will give a representative group of citizens
an opportunity to review the basic methods used in arriving at
valuations generally.
Concerning the review of the valuations placed on specific
parcels of property, a plan will be used which will provide for the
notification of each property owner of the new assessed valuation
that has been placed on his property. This notice will be given
sometime between May 1st and July 1st of this year. Each tax-
payer will be given an opportunity to review his assessment with
the assessor's office. We plan to have the office open from five to
nine o'clock two nights each week for the convenience of those
who are unable to take time during the day. Our records will be
open to the public. Any taxpayer who wishes to compare his
assessment with that of his neighbor across the street or his neigh-
bor next door may do so. The problem in this respect is actually
very simple. Either we have made a mistake in determining the
assessed value, or the valuation is correct. If we have made a mis-
take, we will want to correct it. If the valuation is correct, we will
want the taxpayer to be satisfied that he has been treated on a
basis that is uniform and equitable with other taxpayers.
COMING ATTRACTIONS
The June issue of Dicta will be devoted to articles on various
aspects of the Law of Oil and Gas. It is possible that other issues
in the near future will be devoted to such subjects as Criminal Law
and Procedure, Domestic Relations, and (if it is the wish of Dicta
readers) the Law of Flying Saucers.
The editors of Dicta are always appreciative of any sugges-
tions from members of the bar with regard to particular phases
of the law to which an issue of Dicta might be devoted. The accom-
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